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ABSCAM AND THE CONSTITUTIONt
Louis Michael Seidman*
ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW EN-

Edited by Gerald M. Caplan. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co. 1983. Pp. x, 156. $19.95.
FORCEMENT.

This book, which consists of essays by some very smart people
about ABSCAM and police undercover techniques, serves primarily to
document our present confusion about criminal justice issues. In this
essay, I want to identify two kinds of confusion from which we suffer
and to show how each is linked to underlying problems with a separate
theory of constitutional interpretation.
I

One sort of confusion, which is associated with a theory I will call
"left-wing activism," emerges on the very first pages of the book. In
the course of his spirited and otherwise cogent defense of the ABSCAM operation, Irvin Nathan writes:
Detractors of ABSCAM attempt to portray an image of high-level Justice Department officials engaged in a crusade against selected public
officials or seeking to test the honesty or morality of randomly chosen
politicians. The truth of the matter, as shown by the evidence developed
in eight public trials, is far different. [P. 5.]

Now, it may be, as Nathan asserts, that ABSCAM involved "no
targeting" (p. 4), and that there was "[no] government selection process" (p. 4). It is possible as well, as he also asserts, that the government wisely refrained from "offer[ing] a bribe to randomly selected
public officials" (p. 9). But surely "the truth of the matter" must be
one way or the other. Either targets were selected deliberately, or they
were chosen randomly. 1 Nathan's simultaneous denial of both pro-

t My thanks to Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert Pitofsky, Warren Schwartz, Girardeau
Spann, Mark Tushnet, and Silas Wasserstrom, who commented on an earlier draft of this review,
and to Mary Morton, who provided valuable research assistance.
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1968, University of Chicago;
J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School. - Ed.
1. At various places in his essay, Nathan seems to argue that there was no "government
selection process" because the choice of targets was left to "corrupt intermediaries." See, e.g.,
pp. 4, 9. But, of course, the decision to set traps for those politicians identified by third parties
itself constitutes a method of selection. It is unclear why Nathan thinks that this decision to
delegate the selection process to private individuals, who were not publicly accountable and who,
Nathan concedes, told "outright lies" about a number of politicians, p. 4, is a point in favor of
the operation.
Presumably, Nathan's insistence on the absence of "government selection" is motivated by
1199
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positions makes him like one of my former clients who testified at his
robbery trial that he had not been at the scene of the crime, but that,
in any event, the complainant could not possibly identify him because
of the mask he was wearing at the time.
Nathan's desire to have it both ways is interesting because it corresponds to conflicting intuitions that most of us share about appropriate constraints on police activity. On the one hand, we seem to believe
that police intrusion is justified if the police know specific facts about
the individual target sufficient to make it reasonable to single him out.
Thus, Mark Moore quite sensibly argues that
[a] rational enforcement enterprise (mindful of its obligation to solve
crimes at low cost) would not willingly spend its resources searching in
areas where the likelihood of finding a crime or a criminal was very
low. . . . In this respect, the economizing interests of enforcement
agencies parallel a legal interest in assuring that some justification can be
given for focusing unusually extensive and intensive information gathering in a limited area. [P. 24.]

Yet on the other hand, we also think that police intrusion is justified if
the police are not singling out an individual on the basis of any specific
facts they know about him. Thus, Lawrence Sherman maintains that
"relying on tips and other citizen-initiated methods of obtaining probable cause to start an investigation is a wasteful and inequitable procedure" (p. 125), and that equitable law enforcement requires "selecting
individual targets for deceptive investigations in a way that gives each
member of the target group an equal probability of being selected" (p.
131).
It is easy to see how current fourth amendment doctrine is caught
between these two intuitions. In some contexts, the Supreme Court
has told us that invasions of privacy are permissible only if the police
demonstrate probable cause to believe that they will find what they are
looking for. 2 Yet the courts have also permitted practices like airport
searches, 3 police roadblocks4 and inventory searches5 on the theory
the desire to rebut the claim that the method of selection was invidious. And, indeed, there is no
reason to doubt him when he asserts that "[n]o political official was put off limits; no allegation,
regardless of the party, power, or position of the official involved was disregarded as too hot to
pursue." P. 4. But the important institutional issue about ABSCAM is not the good faith of the
particular officials who ran the operation, but the adequacy of safeguards against officials operating in bad faith. When the problem is viewed from this perspective, there is no escape from the
fact that government officials must opt for some method of selection, that they may well know in
advance the distributional consequences of the method they choose, and that they can, if they
wish, manipulate their choice to achieve undesirable objectives. See text at notes 44-47 infra.
2. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution.").
3. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 907 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The search ••.
occurred as part of a screening process directed not against appellant or any other person as
such, but rather against the general introduction of weapons or explosives in a restricted area.
The search was indiscriminate, and • . . necessarily so, absent a foolproof means of isolating in
advance those few individuals who were genuine hijack risks.").
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that the police lack any special reason to believe that a particular
search will be productive. Indeed, in a stunning reversal of the central
meaning of the fourth amendment, 6 the Court has on occasion held
that the Constitution requires issuance of general warrants designed to
insure that there is no particular basis for individual searches. 7
A second sort of confusion, which is associated with a theory I will
call "right-wing activism," is illustrated by Sanford Levinson's eloquent and erudite essay on the hidden costs of police undercover techniques. Levinson argues that "our security about our lives is radically
dependent on being able to trust 'normal appearances,' and attacks on
this ability to trust may be devastating" (p. 51). Because undercover
techniques are "deeply subversive of the possibility of friendship, love,
and trust" (p. 50), those who advocate their use should have the burden of proving their fairness. "Perhaps [they] can be defended, just as
nonpacifists recognize the appropriate occasions for directed violence,
but we should place greater barriers, including legal ones, in the way
of casually embarking on such use" (p. 51).
Levinson is surely right when he argues that in a sane society
things must generally be as they appear to be. But his reasoning from
this proposition to skepticism about undercover techniques masks a
double paradox.
First, undercover operations destroy our trust in "normal appearances" only in a certain sense. To be sure, on an individual level, the
informer or double agent fools his victim. But on a societal level, the
government has abused no one's trust. On the contrary, it is usually
perfectly open about the use of undercover techniques. 8 Indeed, the
deterrent effect of undercover police work depends upon potential
criminals knowing precisely the way things are. Only if the government publicizes its use of double agents will people think twice about
engaging in criminal conspiracies. 9 Levinson's argument thus depends
4. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976). Cf. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stopping all traffic at roadblock may sufficiently constrain police discretion to satisfy fourth amendment).
5. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
6. The fourth amendment was directed primarily at the problem of "general" or overbroad
warrants not specifying the place to be searched or thing to be seized. See Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
41 (1969).
1. See Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
8. For example, shortly after the ABSCAM operation was disclosed, FBI Director William
Webster publicly announced that there were presently 50 similar operations underway across the
country. P. 3.
9. In defense of ABSCAM, Nathan argues that there is evidence that it has had a substantial
deterrent effect. He cites testimony by FBI officials to the effect that suspects in continuing
investigations attribute their caution to concerns about ABSCAM-type probes. P. 3. Obviously,
this deterrent effect is possible only if potential violators know of the possibility that undercover
operations are underway.
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upon an undefended preference for accurate information when we
make individual, rather than collective, choices.
Second, it is, of course, true that when Congressman Kelly stuffed
$25,000 in cash into his pockets before a hidden videotape camera,
things were not the way they seemed to him at the time. But we
should not lose sight of the fact that if Kelly was guilty, as the jury
found him to be, he himself was engaged in undermining our trust in
"normal appearances." While passing himself off as a public servant
making decisions in the public interest, he in fact had a radically different agenda. Thus, from a different perspective, ABSCAM was an
effort to restore our trust in normal appearances by apprehending
those who violated it. Levinson's attack on operations of this sort
rests on an undefended distinction between governmental action that
deceives and governmental inaction that allows private deception to
continue. 10 This distinction is especially ironic in the ABSCAM context, where the targets of the operation were themselves government
officials engaged in deception.
The problems in Levinson's essay, like those in Nathan's, are reflected in current fourth amendment doctrine. The problem posed by
the dichotomy between individual and collective choice is reflected in
the well-known circularity of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test. The Court purports to apply this test to judge whether an individual's fourth amendment interests have been invaded. 11 Yet those
individual expectations are crucially conditioned by our collective
judgments about what kinds of privacy we wish to preserve. 12 Individual expectations are protected when they are reasonable. But they are
reasonable only because we have collectively announced that we are
going to protect them. 13
10. In fairness, it should be noted that Levinson himself perceives this problem, although he
provides no satisfactory solution for it. See p. 58.
11. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) (no fourth amendment interest in
"open field" because owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy).
12. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), for example, the court held that a depositor's fourth amendment rights were not implicated by a search of bank records in part because
"[t]he lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information ••• was assumed
by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require
records to be maintained because they 'have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and
regulatory investigations and proceedings.' " 425 U.S. at 442-43.
13. On rare occasions, the Court has glimpsed the nature of its dilemma. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), for example, the majority noted that "if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of
privacy regarding their homes, papers and effects." 442 U.S. at 740 n.5. In such cases, where
expectations could be said to have been " 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms," the Court acknowledged that expectations could "play no mean•
ingful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was," and that "a
normative inquiry would be proper." 442 U.S. at 741 n.5. But the Court gave no hint of how it
would generate such norms when not guided by collective decisions about the amount of privacy
we wish to protect.
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The second problem in Levinson's essay, posed by the dichotomy
between public and private deception, is reflected in the incoherence of
our fourth amendment rules regarding state action, privacy in one's
relations with others, and searches conducted with the consent of third
parties. Under current doctrine, an individual has a relatively strong
expectation that the government will not employ its own mechanisms
of coercion or deception to invade an existing privacy interest. But
individuals have no constitutional right to affirmative government protection from private invasions. 14 Nor is there a right to prevent the
government from taking advantage of any private invasion that does
occur. 15 Thus, in a real sense, the Constitution leaves citizens isolated
in their privacy. A person who barricades himself alone in his home
can be relatively secure in his person, house, papers and effects. But
the government provides no security for those without the means to so
protect themselves, and as soon as a person establishes an intimate
relationship with another, he is said to "assume the risk" that he will
be betrayed. 16 Indeed, ironically enough, the more intimate the relationship detroyed by the deceptive conduct, the less protection the
fourth amendment affords. Thus, the fourth amendment rights of a
hotel guest are violated if the manager gives the room key to the police, because the guest has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his
room. 17 Yet if the suspect's spouse admits the police to a house they
share, 18 or his best friend turns double agent and tells the police about
their most private conversations, 19 no fourth amendment problem
arises.

II
I suppose I had better make clear that I have not a clue as to how
these various paradoxes and anomalies should be resolved. I do think,
however, that there is something to be learned by putting them into a
broader context. A peculiar coincidence in the history of academic
discourse about criminal justice has, I believe, artificially narrowed its
scope: At roughly the same time that the modern flowering of constitutional theory began, the Warren Court's criminal justice decisions
became too numerous and complex to fit comfortably into courses on
constitutional law. It was also during this period that the clinical
movement began to take hold. The result has been the development of
14. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
15. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
16. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
19. See, e.g., cases listed at note 16 supra.
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separate criminal law courses staffed by academics, many of whom
think of themselves as pursuing a discipline different from "standard"
constitutional law. This split has tended to obscure the fact that the
fourth, fifth and sixth amendments are, after all, parts of the Constitution, and that the same theories that have influenced application of the
rest of the document have implications for our thinking about control
of the police. If we consider police undercover work in this broader
context, I think we can see that the problems in the Nathan and Levinson essays reflect our ambivalence about competing theories of constitutional adjudication.
In the unlikely event that the man from Mars is an avid reader of
our major law journals, he would no doubt suppose that this competition between theories consists primarily of an argument between advocates of judicial activism and judicial restraint. For the past several
generations, academic discussion has been dominated by efforts to
wrestle with the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" and to develop a
comprehensive theory justifying and limiting judicial review. It
would, of course, be possible to view the problem of police undercover
work through this lens. Were we to do so, we would look for a justification - in the text of the Constitution, in political theory, or in
moral philosophy, depending on one's taste in these matters - for
overriding the judgment of the police and, by extension, that of the
political branches regarding the proper tradeoff between privacy and
crime control.
But it should be apparent to anyone not from Mars that this dispute is sadly out of date. Academics who believe that judicial activism
is fundamentally illegitimate may, in some abstract sense, be right, but
the simple fact of the matter is that today advocates of judicial restraint are everywhere in retreat. There is not now a single authentic
such advocate sitting on the Supreme Court, and there has not been
one in recent memory. 20 If one wants to understand what modem
constitutional debate is really about, the beginning of wisdom is that
the fault line is not between activism and restraint, but between differing styles of activism.
For the sake of convenience, and at the risk of considerable oversimplification, these styles may be labelled "left-wing" and "rightwing." Left-wing judicial activists believe in an active court as part of
an active government. They believe that government as a whole
should intervene vigorously in the private sphere to redistribute assets
20. Justice Rehnquist, widely considered the most likely candidate, is certainly not in this
category. He has dissented from the Court's relatively lenient constitutional scrutiny of statutes
benefiting racial minorities, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stewart, J,, with
whom Rehnquist, J., joins, dissenting), and has insisted on the Supreme Court's duty to invalidate federal invasions of state sovereignty despite the absence of any clear textual justification for
the assertion of this power. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see also
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 302-07 (1976).
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in a more just and equitable fashion and to correct the abuses of private power. When the political branches default in this obligation,
then the courts must intervene to achieve the same ends. 21 Cases such
as Brown v. Board of Education, 22 Shapiro v. Thompson 23 and Craig v.
Boren 24 are representative of this tradition.
In contrast, right-wing judicial activists believe in an active court
because they believe in a passive government. They believe that outcomes reached by the private sphere should be protected from governmental intermeddling. When the political branches invade this sphere,
then it becomes the duty of courts to restrain them through vigorous
and expansive assertion of constitutional values. 25 Cases such as Lochner v. New York, 26 Roe v. Wade 27 and The Pentagon Papers28 fall
squarely in this tradition.
To be sure, like all models, this way of categorizing empirical data
oversimplifies reality. In particular, it would be a mistake to suppose
that the views of any individual Justice can be neatly categorized
under one rubric or another. There are numerous crosscurrents that
influence the Justices' votes and the results in individual cases. Nonetheless, the model has considerable explanatory power. For one thing,
it helps explain how it is that a Court appointed by Presidents who
made "judicial activism" dirty words has turned out to be one of the
most activist in our history. 29 The political attack on the Court in the
21. For a representative example of this view, see Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 6 (1968):
Where the choice is between the Court struggling alone with a social issue and the legislature dealing with it expertly, legislative action is to be preferred. All too often, however, the
practical choice has been between the Court doing the job as best it can and no one doing it
at all. Faced with these alternatives, the court must assume the legislature's responsibility.
If the legislature simply cannot or does not act to correct an unconstitutional status quo, the
Court, despite all its incapacities, must finally act to do so.
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
25. For a classic statement of this view, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399,401 (1923)
(McReynolds, J.):
[The "liberty" protected by the Constitution] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations oflife, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized by common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. . . .
That the state may do much, go very far indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
29. To cite but one dramatic example, by striking down the legislative veto provision at issue
in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), the Burger Court
invalidated in a single day more federal statutes than had previously been struck down in the
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'60s and early '70s was not really an attack on activism at all, but
rather an attack on left-wing activism. The Burger Court's response
to that attack has not been a retreat from the exercise of judicial
power, but rather an expansive reading of the Constitution to protect
private power centers from governmental interference. For example,
the Court has virtually ceded the troubling abortion question to the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists to resolve in any
way it sees fit. 30 The press, 31 organized religion, 32 families 33 and corporations34 have all been told in one way or another that the Constitution leaves them free to exercise private power without having to
account to public institutions for the manner in which that power is
exercised.
Moreover, the model also helps explain some contradictions that
otherwise appear inexplicable. The abortion funding controversy provides a particularly revealing example. How can the same Court that
vigorously defends a woman's right to an abortion also permit the government to "penalize" a woman for exercising that right by withholding funds that she could have if she chose to have a live birth?35 This
seemingly anomalous result becomes perfectly sensible once one understands that Roe was a product of right-wing activism. The distinction between the imposition of a burden and the withholding of a
benefit, although ultimately incoherent, 36 is crucial to the right-wing
world view, and reliance on the distinction has become a hallmark of
the Burger Court. 37 Thus, on this view, Roe was right because it left a
woman and her doctor free to resolve the abortion question without
entire history of the country. See Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. RBV,
473, 473 (1984). See also notes 30-34 infra.
30. See, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2495-96
(1983) (deferring to judgment of American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as well as
American Public Health Association on permissibility of out-patient abortions); see also Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396-97 (1977) (determination whether fetus is viable must be left to
attending physician).
31. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating prior restraint
in press coverage of criminal trial).
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979) (application of
National Labor Relations Act to employees of church-related schools would raise serious free
exercise clause problems).
33. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically
has reflected Western Civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority
over minor children. . • . The statist notion that government power should supersede parental
authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American
tradition.").
34. See, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating statute prohibiting expenditures by banks and corporations for purpose of influencing votes on referenda
proposals).
35. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
36. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
37. As Justice Powell wrote for the Court in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977):
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional
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government intermeddling. But for precisely the same reasons, Harris
v. McCrae was also right because government funding of abortions was
itself a kind of interference with outcomes that would be reached in
the private sphere without government interference.
Of course, the left-wing activist sees things quite differently. He
believes that government has an obligation to intervene when private
forces (in this case the market) lead to inequitable outcomes. Indeed,
his support for Roe in the first place was premised on the assumption
that it would lead to a redistribution of power between men and
women. 38 Through attacks on the right-privilege distinction and exploitation of the "fundamental interest" stand of equal protection jurisprudence, the Warren Court had laid the doctrinal groundwork that
would have supported a constitutional obligation for government to
subsidize abortions. 39 But the days of the Warren Court are long behind us. Because Roe was a right-wing rather than a left-wing decision, the result in Harris was foreordained.

III
If the man from Mars has managed to slog his way through this
much of the Michigan Law Review, he might suppose that protection
from police abuse was high on the agenda of the right wing. In fact,
there is a surprisingly conservative flavor to much of our fourth
amendment jurisprudence - a flavor that comes through in Levinson's essay. The fourth amendment, after all, is a restraint on the exercise of government power, and it pretty much leaves people where it
finds them. If they live in overcrowded slum housing with paper thin
walls, then, at least under present doctrine, they have the right to the
kind of privacy one would expect in that environment. But if they live
in mansions with private security guards, the government is restrained
from changing this "natural" state of affairs by imposing additional
privacy costs that would not otherwise exist.
Of course, in the real world, it has been the right wing that has led
the attack on the fourth amendment. The reasons why this is so are of
interest, I believe, because they help to demonstrate the problems with
right-wing activism generally.
There are two sorts of problems with the right-wing view which,
concerns are greater when the state attempts to impose its will by force of law; the state's
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
For some examples of Burger Court decisions resting on this distinction, see Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980);
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
38. For a defense of Roe on these grounds, see Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 955, 980.81 (1984).
39. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).

1208

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:1199

usefully enough, correspond to the anomalies in Levinson's essay. The
first stems from the need to reconcile right-wing activism with a coherent theory of freedom. All too often, it is supposed that recognition of
constitutional rights leaves individuals free. But of course nothing
could be further from the truth. Disabling government does not make
people free; it simply substitutes private for public coercion. Thus,
getting the government out of the abortion business does not leave a
woman "free" to choose which course to follow. She remains at the
mercy of her doctor, or her parents, or her husband, all of whom may
exercise coercive power over her. 40 Indeed, government intervention to
control the exercise of private power may be an essential precondition
to real freedom. 41
Similarly, constitutional restraints on undercover police work
hardly guarantee a society where privacy and expectations in "normal
appearances" are protected. They simply mean that con-men and
thugs rather than the police will control our lives. This is why Levinson's failure to defend a distinction between government action that
deceives and government inaction that allows private deception to
continue is troubling. For conservatives, the prospect of government
inaction in this context is especially troubling because criminals, unlike, say, the New York Times or General Motors, are likely to use
their unrestrained power to effect a substantial change in the way assets are presently distributed.
Right-wing activists might avoid these dilemmas by claiming that
theirs is not a theory based on freedom in the first place. They might
claim instead that government should be restrained because the defects
in the political process prevent it from aggregating individual preferences as accurately as private markets. Of course, choices in private
markets are "coerced" in the sense that everything has a price. But
the trades that occur in such markets are nonetheless desirable because
the necessity to pay the price assures that utility will be maximized.
But there is a problem with reconciling this utility-based view with
right-wing activism as well. The problem is that government intervention is necessary in order to determine and protect the initial assignment of property rights that allows the market to function. The way
in which it functions, in turn, will depend upon the kind of property
rights government chooses to recognize at the outset. For example, if
40. The internal tensions in the right-wing position are particularly apparent when dealing
with minors, for here the problem of private coercion is a~ute. Arguably, this problem has
caused the Court to turn the principle of Roe on its head. Instead of removing government from
the abortion decision, the Court has held that in some circumstances the Constitution requires a
government official to make the decision for immature minors. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 643-44 (1979) (Powell, J.).
41. Of course, such intervention leaves the people controlled by it less free. Thus, the real
choice is not between tyranny and freedom. Whatever the government does - or does not do one group will get its way and the other will not. The real choice is simply between the competing claims of those groups.
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we start by recognizing a property right in medical benefits to fund
abortions (in which case, their withdrawal is an unconstitutional burden), the market for abortions will be different than it would be if we
recognize no such property right (in which case, the failure to provide
the benefits is a constitutional refusal to subsidize). Which course we
follow can be determined only by some sort of collective, governmental choice.42
The problem of choosing a starting point for measuring fourth
amendment violations is precisely analogous, and it is this problem
that is reflected in Levinson's difficulties in distinguishing between the
legitimacy of individual and collective decisions. It is fine to say that
the police should not upset reasonable privacy expectations. But this
command is coherent only if we establish as an initial matter what
claims of privacy we are prepared to recognize as reasonable, and this
initial choice must, again, be a collective decision. Once the decision is
made - and however it is made - it will then crucially influence the
kinds of expectations private individuals have and the ways in which
they behave. Hence, the notion of private individuals exercising power
without government influence or interference is logically incoherent.
Unfortunately, there are similar logical difficulties with the theory
of left-wing activism. At first, it may seem strange that left-wing activists are worried about the fourth amendment at all. Vigorous police
activity represents an exercise of government power that arguably
serves to redistribute the cost of crime in a more equitable fashion.
Police protection is a kind of public subsidy for people without the
means to protect themselves.
But of course, left-wing activists know that the cost of this subsidy
is not equitably distributed. Far from redistributing power in a fairer
fashion, left-wing activists fear that the police will aggravate the existing maldistribution of wealth and power by picking on "discrete and
insular minorities." It is this fear, I think, that lies behind Nathan's
impulse to insist that ABSCAM targets were not deliberately selected
and Lawrence Sherman's proposal that "sting" victims be randomly
chosen.43 It is not the simple fact of government selection that trou42. In Harris, for example, the majority concedes that "[a] substantial constitutional question
would arise if Congress had attempted to withhold all medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom
to terminate her pregnancy by abortion." 448 U.S. at 317 n.19. In contrast, the failure to
provide medicaid funds for abortions was a mere "refusal to fund protected activity" which,
"without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." 448 U.S.
at 317 n.19. But it should be obvious that this distinction between "penalties" and "failures to
subsidize" depends entirely on how one characterizes the baseline entitlement against which government conduct is measured. If one characterizes the baseline as "medicaid benefits" then the
exclusion of funds for abortion is a mere failure to subsidize. But if one characterizes it instead as
"benefits available to pregnant women," then the withdrawal of those benefits from the class of
women who make a constitutionally protected choice with regard to their pregnancy begins to
look more like a penalty.
43. See pp. 118-33.
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bles them, but the risk that any selection process will be abused so as
to punish unpopular minorities. This fear also explains much that
otherwise appears contradictory in fourth amendment law. Because
we cannot trust the police to distribute privacy costs equitably, they
must either convince a judicial official that they have a sound basis for
picking out individuals for special treatment, or distribute costs widely
enough so that we can be sure that the political check on their activity
will not be negated by the powerlessness of a specially disadvantaged
group.
There are, I think, two sorts of difficulties with this position. First,
left-wing activists need to get straight what they think about government. One view, which seems to lie behind the left-wing version of the
fourth amendment, is that private inequalities will inevitably translate
into unequal political power. We therefore cannot trust the political
branches to distribute privacy costs equitably when they go about the
task of fighting crime. But it is hardly sensible to believe this while
simultaneously looking to government as an engine for social reform.
And it seems particularly bizarre to expect judges - who remain far
richer, better educated, whiter, and maier than the majority of us - to
be the government officials who rescue us from these difficulties and
bring about a just redistribution.
A second problem stems from an ambiguity in the concepts of
"randomness" and "equality" that lie at the heart of the left-wing theory. 44 Sherman argues that it is a requirement of equitable law enforcement that "each member of the target group [have] an equal
probability of being selected" (p. 131). But it is hard to know precisely
what he means by this requirement. Suppose, for example, that the
police are looking for heroin hidden in automobiles and are choosing
between three criteria for selecting the cars to be searched. They can
search all cars with odd-numbered license plates, they can search all
cars in those neighborhoods where heroin traffic is concentrated, or
they can search all cars driven by people who, for one reason or another, appear not to be members of the middle class.
The first thing to notice about this choice is that none of the options is "random" if one means by this term a method of choice involving no criterion of selection. Indeed, given determinist premises,
such a requirement is impossible to satisfy. Nor can any choice satisfy
a requirement of "equality," if one means by this term that ex ante all
cars will have an equal probability of selection. An important theme
reflected in a number of essays in this book is that this requirement is
also impossible to satisfy. The government must decide upon some
method of selection, and any method it chooses will have distributional consequences. Thus, as Mark Moore (p. 37), Wayne Kerstetter
(pp. 135-36), and Peter Reuter (p. 115) all argue, our traditional "reac44. I am grateful to one of my students, David Post, for introducing me to this problem.
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tive" mode of law enforcement, under which police investigations are
triggered by victim complaints and probable cause is required for privacy invasions, leaves white-collar and "victimless" crimes substantially underenforced. Similarly, in some sense, searching only those
cars with certain license plates "discriminates" against the people who
happen to have those plates.
Presumably, then, Sherman's insistence on randomness and equality does not require that the mode of selection have no distributional
consequences, but rather that the person choosing the mode not know
the consequences in advance. 45 Under this definition, the first method
of selection is "random," because having odd-numbered license plates
is unlikely to be systematically associated with any other trait government officials will be aware of when they choose this method. In contrast, the second two methods of selection are not random because
middle-class appearance and location in a particular area are associated with other traits.
If this is what Sherman means, his definition is at least logically
coherent, but it is not immediately apparent why he thinks that this
kind of randomness is a virtue. From an efficiency perspective, it
seems silly to search all cars with odd-numbered license plates when
we could find more heroin at a lower cost by concentrating our search
on cars more likely to contain the drug. 46 Nor is it clear how equality
is promoted by this policy. There is nothing "equal" about applying
the same criterion to two groups who are differently situated with respect to the criterion. Thus, persons having traits making them less
likely to possess drugs can complain of unequal treatment because
they have the same chance of being searched as persons for whom the
search is more likely to be productive. Similarly, owners of cars with
odd-numbered license plates are victimized by unequal treatment because they are treated differently on the basis of a trait that has no
association with the goal the government wishes to advance. This
45. Of course, the person choosing the mode of selection will know the distributional consequences with respect to the criterion for selection. Thus, searching cars with odd-numbered
license plates has distributional consequences, known in advance, for the class of persons with
those license plates. But no one is likely to know in advance what other traits are possessed by
this class.
46. Thus, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978), the Court held unconstitutional "random" or "discretionary" stops of motor vehicles to check for vehicle registration, in part because
"finding an unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely
event than finding an unlicensed driver by choosing 11t random from the entire universe of drivers. • • . In terms of actually discovering unlicensed drivers or deterring them from driving, the
spot check does not appear sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement
practice under the Fourth Amendment." 440 U.S. at 659-60. But given this objection, it is
unclear, to say the least, why the Court was ready to approve "methods for spot checks that . . .
do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." 440 U.S. at 663. One gets a sense of the
amount of confusion it is possible to generate about this issue from Justice Blackmum's readiness
to approve techniques like the search of every tenth car because they are said to be "not purely
random." 440 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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kind of "randomness" is indistinguishable from the sort of irrationality that makes government conduct unconstitutional under even minimal equal protection scrutiny.47 The possibility of condemning
"randomness" on these grounds presumably accounts for Nathan's desire to deny that the selection of ABSCAM targets was random.
Thus, from both equality and efficiency perspectives, it seems more
sensible to prefer a nonrandom method of selection based, for example, on the area of the city in which the car is located. And yet, I think
at least some of us would be troubled by this method, and more troubled still by a method of selection based on lower-class or deviant appearances, even if it could be shown that there was a correlation
between these traits and drug use. Presumably, we are worried that
the police have chosen these criteria not because of the correlation, but
because the group selected is a "discrete and insular minority" victimized by prejudice and unable to form the sort of political coalitions
that would protect it from discriminatory treatment. Insisting on ignorance of distributional consequences thus sacrifices some efficiency,
but in return we gain assurance that the system will produce no permanent losers made to bear disproportionate costs because of prejudice against them.
But the difficulty with making this sacrifice is that it ignores the
possibility that a group selected for disfavored treatment is a discrete
and insular minority precisely because of the correlation that makes
picking this group out the sensible and equitable thing to do. Of
course, there are losers in the political process who consistently and
over a broad range of issues come out on the bottom. But it is at least
theoretically possible that some of these groups consistently lose because they deserve to lose in the sense that membership in the group in
fact consistently correlates with undesirable activity that society
wishes to discourage.
It is also true that other groups may be singled out for "discriminatory" treatment based, not on the incidence of undesirable activity, but
on "prejudice." The dominant culture may have a distorted view of
the characteristics of the disfavored group or may fail to count fairly
their desires in determining social policy. But the important point is
that mere political powerlessness, even when coupled with "discreteness" and "insularity," is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. Political powerlessness may reflect no more than a loss "on the merits."
Permitting judges to reverse political decisions when they are "suspi41. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 422, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring):
So far as the State's purpose is concerned, every ..• claimant's charge, when filed with the
[Fair Employment Practices] Commission, stands on the same footing. Yet certain randomly selected claims, because processed too slowly by the State, are irrevocably terminated
without review. . . • This, I believe, is the very essence of arbitrary state action [violating
the Equal Protection Clause].
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cious" that the decision is based on "prejudice" permits them, in effect, to redetermine the merits. Left-wing activists have yet to explain
how the cause of social justice is advanced by this transfer of power.

IV
One of the important contributions of ABSCAM Ethics is that it
accurately captures the ambivalence many of us feel about police undercover work. The public clearly enjoys watching criminals or corrupt politicians get "stung," and the essays by Nathan, Moore, and
Reuter make a convincing case that such operations may,. on occasion,
serve useful purposes. Yet this public approval is tempered by a vague
feeling of unease - an inchoate sense, reflected in last year's
DeLorean verdict and captured dramatically in Gary Marx's essay,
that "we may be taking small but steady steps toward the paranoia
and suspicion that characterize many totalitarian countries" (p. 94).
In part, I think this ambivalence reflects the fact that many of us
are tom between the attractions of left-wing and right-wing activism.
We want strong leaders and a competent government that will protect
us and provide for us. Yet we also want to be left alone.
But I think that there is also a sense in which our ambivalence
stems from the internal incoherence of both the left-wing and rightwing views. I have argued that some of our confusion about criminal
justice issues can be clarified by sharply distinguishing between these
views. But in important ways, both theories are also alike. They are
both distorted by our loss of confidence in our ability to articulate any
substantive vision of how we wish to interact with each other. Rightwing activists need a substantive theory of freedom that will explain
the way people would act in a world where they were not coerced.
Left-wing activists need a substantive theory of equality that will explain how groups would be aligned in a just society. In the absence of
such theories, both camps have directed their attention to "value-free"
procedural questions, while professing indifference to the outcomes
produced by these procedures. Thus, left-wing activists see courts as
intervening when necessary to correct defects in public markets, while
right-wing activists see them as intervening when necessary to prevent
interference with private markets. Because both of these procedural
approaches are seriously flawed, it is predictable that our thinking
about controlling the police - and about constitutional law in general
- will remain unsatisfactory.

